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Abstract
Distance bounding protocols are security countermeasures designed to thwart
relay attacks. Such attacks consist in relaying messages exchanged between
two parties, making them believe they communicate directly with each other.
Although distance bounding protocols have existed since the early nineties,
this research topic resurrected with the deployment of contactless systems,
against which relay attacks are particularly impactful. Given the impressive
number of distance bounding protocols that are designed every year, it be-
comes urgent to provide researchers and engineers with a methodology to
fairly compare the protocols in spite of their various properties. This paper
introduces such a methodology based on concepts from the decision making
field. The methodology allows for a multi-criteria comparison of distance
bounding protocols, thereby identifying the most appropriate protocols once
the context is provided. As a side effect, this paper clearly identifies the
protocols that should no longer be considered, regardless of the considered
scenario.
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1. Introduction
Distance bounding protocols are the most popular countermeasures against
relay attacks. In a relay attack on an authentication protocol, an adversary
aims to convince the verifier that he directly communicates with the genuine
prover, while the adversary is actually in the middle and relays the mes-
sages exchanged between the two parties. Typically, a relay attack makes
the verifier believe the prover is located within his neighborhood while he is
far away.
1.1. Relay attacks
Conway [15] introduced in 1976 the concept of a relay attack through the
Chess Grandmaster problem where a little girl is challenged to defeat a Chess
Grandmaster in correspondence chess. The solution suggested by Conway to
allow the little girl to be successful is to perform a relay attack between two
Chess Grandmasters: the attack consequently consists in relaying the moves
received between the two Chess Grandmasters, which results for the little
girl in either a won or two draws.
Relay attacks also apply to authentication protocols as originally pro-
posed by Desmedt, Goutier, and Bengio at Crypto 87 [17], whose work was
later extended by Brassard and Quisquater in [7]. In their papers, the au-
thors refuted Shamir’s claims about the Fiat-Shamir protocol [18] when he
says that the protocol is secure even when being executed one million times
in a Mafia-owned store [21]. Desmedt et al. indeed raised that a relay at-
tack is still possible, and they consequently named the suggested relay attack
mafia fraud. Since then, both terms, relay attack and mafia fraud, are used
interchangeably in the literature. Note however that Avoine et al. [1] dis-
tinguish mafia fraud from relay attacks by considering that the adversary
cannot modify the forwarded messages in a relay attack. This distinction
allows for representing an adversary who does not know the specifications of
the considered protocol.
Although mafia fraud was suggested late in the eighties, practical imple-
mentations of this type of fraud appeared much later. Mafia fraud actually
became a real threat with the ubiquity of contactless technologies. For exam-
ple, practical attacks were developed against Radio Frequency IDentification
(RFID) [22, 23], Near Field Communication (NFC) [20], and Passive Key-
less Entry and Start Systems (PKES) in modern cars [19]. For example,
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off-the-shelves devices to perform relay attacks against PKES can be bought
on Internet [12].
1.2. Distance bounding protocols
Mafia fraud does not rely on exploiting security protocol vulnerabilities.
Conventional security mechanisms are thus ineffective against it. Based on
an idea from Beth and Desmedt [8], Brands and Chaum suggested a coun-
termeasure to mafia fraud that consists in measuring the Round-Trip-Time
(RTT) of 1-bit messages exchanged between the parties, using a dedicated
communication channel [10]. In their solution, the verifier measures the
round-trip time tm between the moment he sent a challenge and the moment
he receives the response from the prover. The verifier can consequently esti-
mate a tight upper-bound on the distance between the prover and the verifier
by computing d = c · (tm − td)/2, where c is the speed of light and td is the
delay induced by the prover to compute the response, given the challenge.
Note that distance bounding protocols do not detect relay attacks in a
strict sense. Instead, they detect unexpected delays, and conclude in such
a case that a mafia fraud attack might have occurred. As a consequence,
neither the communication channel, nor the calculation should introduce
flexible timing during the protocol execution, since that could be exploited
by an adversary. For example, requiring the prover to perform heavy compu-
tations in passive contactless systems may allow an adversary to significantly
reduce td by overclocking the prover’s device, which in turn may allow the
adversary to increase tm without making d above the expected upper-bound.
Since Desmedt et al.’s seminal work [8], a conservative assumption for de-
signing distance bounding protocols consists in considering minimally sized
messages (typically 1-bit messages) and lightweight computations during the
time-measurement phase.
1.3. Protocol evaluation
Avoine et al. introduced in [1] a Framework for analyzing distance bound-
ing protocols. This widely used Framework defines four types of fraud that
should be considered in the security evaluation of distance bounding proto-
cols. For the sake of accuracy, the fraud definitions from [1] are provided
in-extenso below.
• Given a distance bounding protocol, an impersonation fraud attack is
an attack where a lonely prover purports to be another one.
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• A mafia fraud attack is an attack where an adversary defeats a dis-
tance bounding protocol using a man-in-the-middle (MITM) between
the reader and an honest tag located outside the neighborhood.
• Given a distance bounding protocol, a distance fraud attack is an attack
where a dishonest and lonely prover purports to be in the neighborhood
of the verifier.
• A terrorist fraud attack is an attack where an adversary defeats a dis-
tance bounding protocol using a man-in-the-middle (MITM) between
the reader and a dishonest tag located outside of the neighborhood,
such that the latter actively helps the adversary to maximize her at-
tack success probability, without giving to her any advantage for future
attacks.
The security evaluation of a distance bounding protocol then consists in
computing the resistance of the protocol for every type of fraud, which is
done by computing the probability for an adversary to successfully perform
the considered fraud.
Since Brands and Chaum’s breakthrough, many distance-bounding pro-
tocols have been proposed1, which deliver improvements in terms of security
(see Section 2). These proposals also introduce new requirements on the
protocols, e.g., to be usable on noisy channels, and properties, e.g., to be
more computationally efficient or to require less memory. Given the var-
ious requirements and properties, a fair methodology to compare distance
bounding protocols is strongly needed.
1.4. Contribution
This paper introduces a methodology based on concepts from the decision
making field to perform a multi-criteria comparison of distance bounding
protocols. The methodology identifies the most desirable protocols, given
a set of required properties, and disqualifies protocols that are dominated
by better solutions whatever the considered properties. Even though the
methodology can be understood without difficulty, applying it on a large set
of distance bounding protocols may be time-consuming. As a consequence,
an open-source computer tool was released in order to easily include into the
comparison future distance bounding protocols and new criteria.
1http://www.avoine.net/rfid/
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Table 1: List of protocols and their acronyms.
Authors Reference Year Acronym
Brands and Chaum [10] 1993 BC
Cˇapkun, Buttya´n,and Hubaux [13] 2003 MAD
Bussard and Bagga [11] 2005 BB
Hancke and Kuhn [24] 2005 HK
Munilla and Peinado [28] 2006 MP
Kim, Avoine, Koeune, Standaert, and Pereira [27] 2008 Swiss-Knife
Avoine and Tchamkerten [5] 2009 Tree-based
Trujillo-Rasua, Martin, and Avoine [33] 2010 Poulidor
Rasmussen and Cˇapkun [29] 2010 RC
Yum, Kim, Hong and Lee [34] 2010 YKHL
Kim and Avoine [26] 2011 KA
Boureanu, Mitrokotsa, and Vaudenay [9] 2013 SKI
Trujillo-Rasua, Martin, and Avoine [31] 2014 TMA
2. Background
Distance bounding protocols are authentication protocols that, in addi-
tion, compute an upper bound on the distance between the prover and the
verifier. Since we focus on the distance bounding properties of such proto-
cols, we ignore any such protocol that does not even achieve authentication,
e.g., due to impersonation attacks or key-recovery attacks [30]. The consid-
ered protocols are briefly introduced and classified according to their main
features, which are the features that occur most frequently in literature and
that should be taken into account to compare the protocols. The protocols
are listed in Table 1.
2.1. Compared protocols
2.1.1. Resistance to mafia and distance fraud.
The earliest distance bounding protocol, introduced by Brands and Chaum
in 1993 [10], consists of an initial commitment phase, followed by n rounds
where the verifier sends a single-bit challenge and receives a single-bit re-
sponse from the prover. The protocol is then completed with a final phase
where the commitment is opened and a signature of the exchanged messages
is provided by the prover. The phase during which the round trip time (RTT)
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is measured is known as being the fast phase while the other ones are known
as the slow phases. The BC protocol, provided in Algorithm 1, reaches the
optimal security bound (1/2)n against both mafia and distance fraud, where
n is the number of rounds2. The authors, however, left as an open problem
the design of a distance-bounding protocol that resists to terrorist fraud as
well.
Algorithm 1: Brands and Chaum’s Protocol
Verifier Prover
(prover’s public key
Kv)
(prover’s private key
Ks)
Commit(m1|| . . . ||mn)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− mi ∈R {0, 1}
begin of fast phase
Pick a random bit ci
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = mi ⊕ ci
end of fast phase
Open(Commit), SignKs (c1||r1|| . . .)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check ri and the
RTTs
Verify SignKs
2.1.2. Resistance to terrorist fraud.
The challenge of designing a protocol resistant to terrorist fraud was
taken up later in 2005 by Bussard and Bagga [11], who proposed a protocol
similar in design to the BC protocol. In addition to commitment and sig-
nature schemes, the BB protocol uses a (2, 2)-secret sharing scheme aimed
at defeating terrorist fraud. However, Avoine, Lauradoux, and Martin [4]
2For every distance bounding protocol with a single fast phase consisting of n rounds
of 1-bit exchanges, an adversary who answers randomly during the fast phase and relays
all the other messages succeeds with probability (1/2)
n
[1].
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demonstrated that a (2, 2)-secret sharing scheme is insufficient to thwart ter-
rorist fraud: a (3, 3)-secret sharing scheme should be used instead.
Later on, in 2008, a first distance-bounding protocol resistant to some
extent to terrorist fraud was suggested by Kim et al. [27]. This protocol
was named the Swiss-knife distance-bounding protocol – in reference to the
multi-tool Swiss army knife – due to its ability to deal with mafia, distance,
and terrorist fraud at the same time. Nevertheless, its resistance value of
(3/4)n to both mafia and terrorist fraud falls far beyond the optimal security
bound (1/2)n.
More recently, in 2013, the SKI family of protocols was designed by Boure-
anu, Mitrokotsa, and Vaudenay [9] to counter terrorist fraud. The SKI pro-
tocols do not perform better than existing protocols, but they benefit from
the availability of security proofs.
2.1.3. Final slow phase and lightweight cryptographic operations.
The boom of RFID technology in the early 21st century, impulsed by Wal-
mart’s3 announcement of tagging pallets and cases of goods with RFID tags,
motivated Hancke and Kuhn to design the first distance-bounding protocol
for resource-constrained devices [24]. To do so, they dropped the objective of
making the protocol secure against terrorist fraud, and focused on eliminating
both the final slow phase and the need of expensive cryptographic primitives,
such as commitment and signing. The drawback of the HK protocol is its
low resistance to both distance and mafia fraud, which is (3/4)n [24, 33].
Inspired by the strengths and weaknesses of Hancke and Kuhn’s proposal,
several other distance-bounding protocols were proposed [5, 28, 26, 33, 31,
34]. All of them aim at improving the security to both mafia fraud and
distance fraud, while keeping the simple design of the HK protocol to make
them suitable for low-cost devices. The protocols proposed in [34, 31] also aim
extra features such as mutual authentication and noise resiliency respectively.
2.1.4. Memory.
Among the protocols inspired by the HK protocol, the tree-based proto-
col proposed by Avoine and Tchamkerten [5] achieves the best asymptotic
security to mafia and distance fraud. Unfortunately, the tree-based protocol
requires an exponential amount of memory w.r.t. the number of rounds of
3Walmart is the largest retailer in the world.
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the fast phase. To mitigate this problem, the authors [5] suggest a trade-off
between memory requirement and security by parameterizing the depth of
the tree.
Another approach by Trujillo-Rasua, Martin, and Avoine [33] consists in
using a graph instead of a tree. This protocol, named Poulidor, requires a
linear memory instead of an exponential one, but degrades the resistance
to mafia and distance fraud in comparison to the tree-based protocol. An
additional issue is that the analysis of Poulidor is complex [32] and only
conservative bounds on the resistance to the various types of fraud have
been provided.
To increase the resistance to mafia and distance fraud without signif-
icantly increasing the memory requirement, Kim and Avoine [26] proceed
differently and suggest a trade-off between distance and mafia fraud resis-
tance, which can be adapted to any given scenario.
2.1.5. Single-bit exchanges.
Based on the HK protocol, Munilla and Peinado introduced a distance-
bounding protocol [28] where three-state challenges are used instead of binary
challenges. This idea was later improved and generalized by MUSE [2], which
assumes a multiple-bit channel during the fast phase. Actually, MUSE is a
technique (not a protocol per se) that transforms any single-bit challenge
protocol into a multiple-bit challenge protocol. Empirical results in [2] sug-
gest that a MUSE transformation achieves better security properties than
the single-bit challenge counterpart. For instance, the resistance of the BC
protocol [10] to mafia fraud is (1/2)n, while its MUSE transformation with
a 2-bit channel achieves (1/4)n. In both protocols, n denotes the number
of rounds during the fast phase, which means that the security is measured
in terms of number of rounds. However, considering the number of bits
exchanged during the fast phase, denoted e, the security of both protocols
becomes equal to (1/2)e. This illustrates the difficulty in comparing protocols
that require different properties concerning the channels.
2.2. Protocol evaluation
To the best of our knowledge, Kim et al. [27] were the first authors com-
paring their protocol against previously proposed distance bounding proto-
cols. They used a tabular form and evaluated eight different protocols in
terms of mafia and terrorist fraud resistance, number of cryptographic oper-
ations to be performed by the prover, noise resiliency of the protocol, privacy
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preservation, and mutual authentication. In the comparisons published later
on, the last three properties are generally not considered, as done for example
in [9]. It is worth noting that the mentioned criteria are equally important
and cannot be ranked: this implies that protocols can be compared according
to one criterion at a time only. Note also that the resistance to attacks is
generally evaluated asymptotically, i.e., when the number of rounds tends to
infinity. However, a protocol might be asymptotically better than another
protocol, while it is worse for some small number of rounds.
Trujillo-Rasua et al. [33, 31] suggested a significantly different technique
to compare distance bounding protocols, where the comparison is based on
two criteria and is no longer done asymptotically. So, for every protocol
and for every (discretized) pair (m, d) of mafia and distance fraud resistance
values in [0, 1]2, the technique computes the minimum number of rounds n
needed to reach these values. For every pair (m, d), the best protocol is
the one that requires the smallest value n. Figure 1 represents the result of
the comparison applied to the Poulidor, HK, KA, and tree-based protocols
in [33]. The 2D chart displays the best protocol (or one of the best protocols
in case of equality) among the four considered ones for every possible value
of mafia and distance fraud. For example, when (m, d) = (1, 1), the best
protocol is HK.
The comparison methodology introduced by Trujillo-Rasua et al. is more
advanced than the one suggested by Kim et al., but its usability remains
limited. Indeed, Trujillo-Rasua et al.’s methodology requires criteria that
impact the objective function, which is minimizing the value n. For example,
applying the methodology with the criteria “mafia fraud resistance” and
“presence of a final slow phase” is meaningless, given that the presence or
not of a final slow phase does not depend on n. Another weakness – although
the core of the methodology is not concerned – is the 2D representation of
the result, which is inappropriate when considering more than two criteria.
3. Methodology
Multi-criteria decision-making actually consists in making a decision,
namely selecting the best solution(s) in a set of possible solutions, when the
evaluation of solutions depends on several criteria. For example, buying a car
is a multi-criteria decision making problem, because price, size, horsepower,
color, etc. are different criteria that influence the decision. Similarly, choos-
ing a distance bounding protocol is a multi-criteria decision-making problem
9
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Figure 1: A visual representation [33] of the comparison of Poulidor [33], the HK proto-
col [24], the KA protocol [25], and the tree-based protocol using trees of depth 3 (Tree-
3) [5].
where several security and implementability criteria need to be considered.
This section defines the relevant attributes that ought to be considered in dis-
tance bounding protocols, together with the concepts of approximate equality,
attribute spaces, dominant relation, and protocol instance.
3.1. Attributes
Decision criteria are built on atomic attributes that charaterize the op-
tions available, namely the distance bounding protocols in our case. The
most common attributes used in the literature to evaluate distance bounding
protocols are related to security and implementability. These attributes are
introduced below.
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3.1.1. Security-related attributes.
The security challenge aims to reduce the adversary’s probability to suc-
cessfully perform a mafia, distance, or terrorist fraud attack4. The three
following attributes are consequently considered in this paper:
• Mafia fraud resistance (pm). Probability for an adversary to success-
fully perform a mafia fraud attack according to the Framework [1] al-
ready mentioned in Section 1.
• Distance fraud resistance (pd). Probability for an adversary to success-
fully perform a distance fraud attack according to the Framework.
• Terrorist fraud resistance (pt). Probability for an adversary to success-
fully perform a terrorist fraud attack according to the Framework.
Other security-related attributes are the number of rounds n and the
size t of the messages exchanged during the fast phase. On the one hand,
most distance bounding protocols can arbitrarily increase t while keeping
n constant [2], which enhances their security. On the other hand, security
can also be improved by simply increasing n. Both attributes are indeed
related by the equation e = 2 · n · t, where e represents the number of bits
exchanged during the fast phase. We therefore consider e to be a security-
related attribute that encompasses both n and t.
• Number of bits exchanged (e). Number of bits exchanged during the
fast phase.
3.1.2. Implementability-related attributes.
When Hancke and Kuhn [24] proposed a simple and lightweight design
of distance bounding protocol, the objective was to reduce the number of
cryptographic operations to be performed by the prover, and to avoid the
use of a final slow phase. Consequently, these two implementability-related
attributes are considered in this paper.
• Number of cryptographic operations performed by the prover (c). The
number of cryptographic operations performed by the prover is consid-
ered, because it provides a preliminary technology-independent evalu-
ation of the computational cost of the protocols.
4Another type of fraud, named distance hijacking, was recently introduced by Cremers,
Rasmussen, Schmidt, and Cˇapkun [16], but this fraud is usually disregarded in the analysis.
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• Final slow phase (f). Presence (or not) of a final slow phase in the
protocol.
Later on, memory usage became a concern as well, because the prover in
the tree-based protocol [5] pre-computes a tree whose size is exponential w.r.t.
the number of rounds of the fast phase. Memory is consequently considered
as an implementability-related attribute:
• Memory used by the prover (s). Maximum size of the volatile memory
that the prover needs in order to store the values used during the proto-
col execution. Note that in practice, the actual size of the memory can
be smaller because memory cells might be released and subsequently
refilled with other values during the execution of the protocol. Con-
sidering the prover’s memory instead of the verifier’s memory is mo-
tivated by the prevailing design of distance bounding protocols where
the prover needs to pre-compute all the possible answers before the fast
phase, whereas verifying the prover’s answers might not require heavy
pre-computation and can be performed at the end of the protocol.
Finally, the implementation complexity of a distance bounding protocol
strongly depends on the technology considered. This makes it challenging to
perform an objective evaluation with that respect. In particular, some proto-
cols require channels that carry atomic symbols containing more than one bit
of information. Although technologically feasible, this requirement is strong
enough to be taken into account when comparing two protocols. In the same
vein, some protocols use multiple-bit exchanges during the fast phase, while
a conservative assumption since Desmedt et al.’s work [8] consists in consid-
ering 1-bit messages. This clear distinction between those distance bounding
protocols that use single-bit exchanges during the fast phase and those that
use multiple-bit exchanges is captured by the following implementability-
related attribute.
• Multiple-bit exchange (b). A binary attribute stating the use (or not)
of multiple-bit exchanges.
3.2. Attribute spaces and (non)domination
When solving decision-making problems, it is important to consider a
notion of approximate equality on the domains of the attributes. To illustrate
this, consider someone who wants to buy a second-hand car among cars that
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differ on mileage and price only. When mileages are different but very close,
they can be considered in the same mileage range, and only the price should
lead the decision.
In this section, we first provide the general terminology and notation,
afterwards we define the attribute domain and approximate equality for every
considered attribute.
Definition 1 (Approximate equality). Let (D,<) be a totally ordered
set. An approximate equality relation ∼ : D × D is a relation satisfying,
for all x, y, z ∈ D,
x ∼ x
x ∼ y =⇒ y ∼ x
x ∼ z ∧ x < y < z =⇒ x ∼ y ∧ y ∼ z.
The first two properties state that approximate equality satisfies reflexiv-
ity and symmetry. The third property expresses that it is consistent with the
total order on D. Notice that approximate equality is not an equivalence re-
lation, because it doesn’t satisfy transitivity. The reason is that many small
differences can add up to a large difference.
Given a totally ordered set with approximate equality, we can define the
relation ≺ : D ×D by
x ≺ y ⇐⇒ x < y ∧ x 6∼ y.
Similarly, we define x 4 y by x ≺ y ∨ x ∼ y and the symmetric cases
x  y and x < y by y ≺ x and y 4 x, respectively. Next, we extend these
comparison operators to attribute spaces.
Definition 2. Let I be an index set, then a family of ordered sets with ap-
proximate equality (Di, <i,∼i)i∈I is called an attribute space.
For an index set I = {1, . . . , n}, we simplify notation by stating that
∆ = D1× . . .×Dn is an attribute space and that its elements are of the form
x¯ = (x1, . . . , xn). We define the dominant relation ≺ : ∆×∆ for x¯, y¯ ∈ ∆ by
x¯ ≺ y¯ ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ I (xi 4 yi) ∧ ∃i ∈ I (xi ≺ yi).
If x¯ ≺ y¯, we say that x¯ dominates y¯, otherwise, if x¯ 6≺ y¯, we say that y¯
is nondominated by x¯. Similarly, given E ⊆ ∆ and x¯ ∈ E, we say that x¯ is
nondominated in E if
¬∃y¯ ∈ E (y¯ ≺ x¯).
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Given that we are considering eight different attributes, we next define a
totally ordered set with approximate equality relation for the eight considered
attributes: pm, pd, pt, e, c, s, f , and b.
• (Di, <i,∼i)i∈{pm,pd,pt}: The attributes related to the three types of fraud
are in the probability domain [0, 1], i.e., Di = [0, 1] for i ∈ {pm, pd, pt}.
In order to provide reasonable approximate equality relations for the
three probability-based attributes, we consider that the adversary’s
probability of success should be more refined as it approaches 0. There-
fore, a security value x can be represented by the interval
(
x
2
, 2x
)
. The
approximate equality relations are thus defined as follows.
∀i ∈ {pm, pd, pt}(x ∼i y ⇐⇒ x
2
< y < 2x).
The fact that this relation satisfies the three requirements from Defini-
tion 1 follows from simple algebraic reasoning.
• (Di, <i,∼i)i∈{e,c}: Both the number of bits exchanged (e) in the fast
phase and the number of cryptographic operations (c) are in the domain
of the natural numbers N. Their approximate equality relations ∼c and
∼e are simply the equality in N.
• (Ds, <s,∼s): Memory (s) is in the domain of the natural numbers N,
and its approximate equality relation is defined by scaling from bits to
kilobits. Defining ∼s in that way is a pragmatic approach based on
experience in the field of contactless systems where any saving on a
single kilobit is worthy. However, decision makers could use a different
relation, based on, e.g., megabytes. Formally, ∼s is defined as follows.
x ∼s y ⇐⇒ |x− y| < 1024.
• (Df , <f ,∼f ): Presence of a final slow phase (f) is a nominal attribute
in the Boolean domain. Protocols avoiding this phase are normally
designed for low-cost devices [24]. We thus define both the total order
and the approximate equality relations as follows.
x <f y ⇐⇒ x = false ∧ y = true.
x ∼f y ⇐⇒ x = y.
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• (Db, <b,∼b): Use of a multiple-bit channel (b) is also in the Boolean
domain. A single-bit exchange protocol can be easily improved by
transforming it to a multiple-bit protocol [2]. Consequently, we define
the total order and the approximate equality relation as follows.
x <b y ⇐⇒ x = false ∧ y = true.
x ∼b y ⇐⇒ x = y.
3.3. Solution
The methodology introduced in this paper does not aim to identify the
best protocol in a general way but, instead, to identify the set of nondomi-
nated protocols. Intuitively, a nondominated protocol satisfies that it is not
possible to improve by moving away from it to another protocol without
degrading the result w.r.t. at least one attribute.
Providing a given protocol with attribute values typically requires one to
specify values for protocol-specific parameters, e.g., the number of rounds.
We thus consider protocol instances, which are protocols for which all such
parameters have been instantiated and whose attribute values can be unam-
biguously determined. In order to not introduce additional notation, we sim-
ply represent this one-to-many relation from protocols to protocol instances
by means of identifiers. In short, a protocol instance is a pair (PI, x) where
PI is an identifier that uniquely identifies a full-specification of a protocol,
and x ∈ ∆ provides the attribute values for the fully-specified protocol PI.
We recall that ∆ = Dpm×Dpd×Dpt×De×Dc×Ds×Df×Db is the attribute
space defined in Section 3 over the index set I = {pm, pd, pt, e, c, s, f, b}.
Definition 3 (Solution). Given a set of protocol instances E, a solution in
our methodology is the subset S ⊆ E of maximum cardinality such that for
every (Px, x¯) ∈ S there does not exist (Py, y¯) ∈ E such that y¯ ≺ x¯. We say,
in this case, that (PI, x¯) is nondominated in E.
We also say that a protocol instance (Px, x¯) dominates another proto-
col instance (Py, y¯) if and only if x¯ ≺ y¯. If x¯ 6≺ y¯, we say that (Py, y¯) is
nondominated by (Px, x¯).
To illustrate the nondominated relation between two protocol instances,
we make use of spider charts [14]. Spider charts (also known under various
other names, such as radar charts) are simple graphs that make it possible to
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quickly compare the relative scores of a number of alternatives along various
axes. An example of a spider chart is given in Figure 2. There we present two
protocol instances: one corresponds to Brands and Chaum’s protocol [10]
(labeled “BC-{16}”) when n = 16, and the other one to the tree-based
protocol [5] (labeled “Tree-{16, 8}”) with depth equal to 8 and n = 16. The
axes related to the types of fraud are logarithmically scaled from 1 (chart
center) to log2(
1
2n
) (chart outer); the axes related to the Boolean attributes
are graduated with true (chart center) and false (chart outer). Finally, the
axes concerning memory size and number of cryptographic operations are
graduated from 10 (chart center) to 0 (chart outer). In order to focus on the
differences between the protocols, we will often only display the attribute
axes for which the protocols have different values and the security-related
attributes. Consequently, in the current example, we omitted the e and b
axes.
mafia
fraud
distance
fraud
terrorist
fraud
memory
crypto
operations
final
slow phase
Tree-based BC
Figure 2: Spider chart for the protocol instances BC-{16} and Tree-{16, 8}.
A solution S, in the sense of Definition 3, can be seen as the set of relevant
protocol instances a decision maker should focus on. A similar use can be
given by distance bounding protocol designers, whose ultimately goal must
be to include their protocols in S w.r.t. some set of criteria. The role of
S is empirically illustrated in the next section where several state-of-the-art
distance bounding protocols are evaluated and compared by applying our
methodology.
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4. Methodology applied to current protocols
This section reports on the results obtained after applying our methodol-
ogy to the protocols listed in Table 1. Instead of computing raw data to be
served as input to a state-of-the-art decision making tool, the methodology
has been implemented and published as an open source Java project5. The
computer tool, based on Table 2, comprises the thirteen distance bounding
protocols listed in Table 1 so as to generate protocol instances as defined
in Section 3. The decision to develop a computer tool is supported by the
growing number of distance bounding protocols proposed and the continual
refinement of their security analysis [6, 1, 27]. Our tool therefore is aimed at
facilitating the addition and modification of new protocols and criteria.
4.1. Protocol instances
Protocol instances are built by assigning values to protocol-specific pa-
rameters. In order to create a comprehensive set of protocol instances, we
use ranges of values a bit wider than those considered in the literature. For
instance, we consider protocols executing from 1 to 256 rounds during the
fast phase, while in the literature this number varies from 16 to 64. Other
security-related parameters, namely the size of nonces (δ), secret keys (κ),
and cryptographic primitives (σ), are considered to be large enough so that
attacks based on, for example, short keys, are unfeasible. The remaining
parameter values are detailed in Table 3.
Once all parameter values are defined, we use Table 2 to obtain all pro-
tocol instances. This leads to a set E of 29184 protocol instances, which is
used as input to our methodology.
4.2. Comparison
Comparing is definitely a decision making task. Decisions ought to be
made for the sake of providing meaningful results. Nevertheless, the com-
parison problem differs from classical decision making problems in the role
of the decision maker. The former problem should not reflect the point of
view of the decision maker, but conciliate decisions and criteria based on a
proper understanding of the problem and an exhaustive literature research.
5The source code can be freely downloaded from https://github.com/rolandotr/
db_comparison
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Table 2: Formulas to compute the attribute values for every considered protocol. Refer-
ences to the sources of the formulas are included when applicable. Additional notation is
introduced below.
• σ: size of signature, commitment, and MAC.
• δ: size of the random nonces.
• `: depth of the tree in the tree-based approach [5].
• α: number of predefined challenges in KA [26].
• pf : probability of occurrence of a void-challenge in MP [28].
• t: size of the messages exchanged in the fast phase.
Protocols pm pd pt f b c s
BC
(
1
2
)n
[10]
(
1
2
)n
[10] 1 Y Y 2 2n+ 3σ
BB
(
1
2
)n
[11]
(
1
2
)n
[11] 1 [4] Y Y 4 3n+ δ
MAD
(
1
2
)n
[13]
(
1
2
)n
[13] 1 Y Y 4 2n+ 2δ + 5σ
HK
(
3
4
)n
[24]
(
3
4
)n
[33] 1 N Y 1 3n+ 2δ
MP cf. [1] cf. [1] 1 Y Y 2 4n+ 2δ + σ
Swiss-Knife
(
1
2
)n
[27]
(
3
4
)n
[27]
(
3
4
)n
[27] Y Y 2 3n+ 3δ + 2σ
Tree-based
((
1
2
)` ( `
2
+ 1
))bn` c
cf. [33] 1 N Y 1
(
2`+1 − 1) bn
`
c+
2δ + n
Poulidor cf. [33] cf. [33] 1 N Y 1 5n+ 2δ
RC
(
1
2
)n
[29]
(
1
2
)n
[29] 1 Y N 3 2δ + 2σ
YKHL cf. [3]
(
7
8
)n
1 N Y 1 5n+ 2δ
KA cf. [26]
(
3
4
)n−α
[26] 1 N Y 1 4n+ 2δ
SKI
(
t+1
2t
)n
[9] ≤ (3
4
)n
[9]
(
2t−2
2t
)n
[9] N N 1 n(t+ 1)+
2δ + 2σ
TMA cf. [31] cf. [31] 1 N N 1 4n+ 2δ
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Table 3: Parameter values for the considered protocols. For the KA protocol we use the
parameter pd instead of α given that α = bpd × nc [26].
Protocol Identifier Parameter values
BC BC-{n} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}
MAD MAD-{n} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}
BB BB-{n} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}
HK HK-{n} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}
MP MP-{n, pf} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}pf ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.01, · · · , 1}
Swiss-Knife Swiss-Knife-{n} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}
Tree-based Tree-{n, `} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}
` ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 32}
Poulidor Poulidor-{n} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}
RC RC-{n} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}
YKHL YKHL-{n} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}
KA KA-{n, pd} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}pd ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.01, · · · , 1}
SKI SKI-{n, t} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}
t ∈ {2, 3, · · · , 32}
TMA TMA-{n} n ∈ {1, · · · , 256}
Along this article we have made a couple of decisions already. For in-
stance, distance bounding protocols that fail on achieving any sort of au-
thentication were discarded in Section 2. Section 3 limits the number of
considered attributes to 8 by choosing those frequently used in the litera-
ture. And Section 4 defines a wide range of parameter values in order to
generate a comprehensive set of protocol instances. We claim that all these
decisions are consistent with the state-of-the-art in distance bounding and,
therefore, keep our experiments as fair as possible.
Our last decision concerns a security criterion: mafia fraud resistance.
All distance bounding protocols must resist to mafia fraud to some extent.
We thus consider different upper-bounds on the probability of success of an
adversary mounting this type of fraud. More precisely, given the set E of
29184 protocol instances defined previously and a probability value y ∈ [0, 1],
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we define the set E[y] = {(PI, x) ∈ E|y ≤ xpm}6 containing those protocols
whose resistance to mafia fraud is bounded by y. In what follows we do not
longer consider the whole set E, but subsets E[y] for different values of y.
To illustrate further the need of this decision let us consider a protocol
that does nothing. Because this protocol requires no resource to be imple-
mented, it would be nondominated even though it can be hardly considered
a distance bounding protocol. Considering E[y] for some y < 1 instead of E,
provides a quantifiable security guarantee in terms of mafia fraud that can
only be provided by actual distance bounding protocols. Moreover, varying
y allows us to see how the set of nondominated protocols evolves when y
decreases. Table 4 shows such evolution considering y to range within the
set {2−1, 2−16, 2−32, 2−64, 2−96, 2−128}.
According to Table 4, seven out of the thirteen considered protocols have
at least one instance that is nondominated for some set E[y]. In this case,
we say that these protocols are nondominated. The seven nondominated
protocols are BC, KA, SKI, Swiss-Knife, TMA, Poulidor, and Tree-based.
We intuitively explain this result as follows.
• BC, BB, MAD, and RC, achieve the optimal security in terms of both
mafia and distance fraud (see Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix). Con-
sequently, none of them can be dominated by any of the remaining nine
protocols. However, BC leaves out BB, MAD, and RC, from the set of
nondominated protocols because it requires fewer calls to cryptographic
functions.
• Swiss-Knife and SKI are the only protocols that resist to terrorist fraud
(see Figure 6 in the Appendix). They do not dominate each other as it
is illustrated by the Spider Chart 3(b). Both are thus nondominated.
• Tree-based, Poulidor, and TMA, are the best in terms of distance fraud
(see Figure 5) among the protocols using single-bit exchanges and a
single cryptographic operation. Because they do not dominate each
other (see the Spider Chart 3(a)), the three are included in the set of
nondominated protocols.
6We recall that x is in the attribute space ∆ = Dpm×Dpd×Dpt×De×Dc×Ds×Df×Db
and xi ∈ Di for every i ∈ {pm, pd, pt, e, c, s, f, b}.
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Table 4: Nondominated protocol instances for different sets E[y]. Every security value p
and memory value m has been scaled according to the equations 2dlog2 pe and bm/1024c
respectively. For the sake of compactness, this table only shows for each protocol the
nondominated protocol instance (if any) with fewer bits exchanged during the fast phase.
The total number of nondominate protocols is given in the last column.
y
Nondominated Attribute values
Prot. Instances n pm pd pt b c s f total
2−1
BC-{1} 1 2−1 2−1 20 false 2 0Kb true 256
KA-{2, 0.5} 2 2−1 2−0 20 false 1 0Kb false 10
SKI-{3, 2} 3 2−1 2−1 2−3 true 1 1Kb false 254
SwissKnife-{1} 1 2−1 2−0 2−0 false 2 1Kb true 255
TMA-{2} 2 2−1 2−1 20 false 1 0Kb false 1
Tree-{2, 2} 2 2−1 2−0 20 false 1 0Kb false 400
2−16
BC-{16} 16 2−16 2−16 20 false 2 0Kb true 241
KA-{22, 0.55} 22 2−16 2−4 20 false 1 0Kb false 4
Poulidor-{23} 23 2−16 2−8 20 false 1 0Kb false 1
SKI-{39, 2} 39 2−16 2−16 2−39 true 1 0Kb false 218
SwissKnife-{16} 16 2−16 2−6 2−6 false 2 0Kb true 241
TMA-{27} 27 2−16 2−16 20 false 1 0Kb false 1
Tree-{24, 6} 24 2−16 2−10 20 false 1 0Kb false 394
2−32
BC-{32} 32 2−32 2−32 20 false 2 0Kb true 225
KA-{37, 0.85} 37 2−32 2−2 20 false 1 0Kb false 2
Poulidor-{42} 42 2−32 2−16 20 false 1 0Kb false 1
SKI-{78, 2} 78 2−32 2−32 2−78 true 1 0Kb false 179
SwissKnife-{32} 32 2−32 2−13 2−13 false 2 0Kb true 225
TMA-{53} 53 2−32 2−32 20 false 1 0Kb false 1
Tree-{48, 6} 48 2−32 2−21 20 false 1 1Kb false 368
2−64
BC-{64} 64 2−64 2−64 20 false 2 0Kb true 193
KA-{73, 0.8} 73 2−64 2−6 20 false 1 0Kb false 4
Poulidor-{78} 78 2−64 2−32 20 false 1 0Kb false 1
SKI-{155, 2} 155 2−64 2−64 2−155 true 1 0Kb false 102
SwissKnife-{64} 64 2−64 2−26 2−26 false 2 0Kb true 193
TMA-{106} 106 2−64 2−64 20 false 1 0Kb false 1
Tree-{96, 6} 96 2−64 2−43 20 false 1 2Kb false 295
2−96
BC-{96} 96 2−96 2−96 20 false 2 0Kb true 161
KA-{113, 0.75} 113 2−96 2−12 20 false 1 0Kb false 5
Poulidor-{114} 114 2−96 2−49 20 false 1 0Kb false 1
SKI-{232, 2} 232 2−96 2−96 2−232 true 1 1Kb false 25
SwissKnife-{96} 96 2−96 2−39 2−39 false 2 1Kb true 161
TMA-{158} 158 2−96 2−96 20 false 1 0Kb false 1
Tree-{144, 6} 144 2−96 2−64 20 false 1 3Kb false 223
2−128
BC-{128} 128 2−128 2−128 20 false 2 0Kb true 129
KA-{145, 0.8} 145 2−128 2−12 20 false 1 0Kb false 4
Poulidor-{148} 148 2−128 2−65 20 false 1 0Kb false 1
SKI-{219, 3} 219 2−128 2−90 2−128 true 1 1Kb false 1
SwissKnife-{128} 128 2−128 2−53 2−53 false 2 1Kb true 129
TMA-{210} 210 2−128 2−128 20 false 1 1Kb false 1
Tree-{160, 16} 160 2−128 2−77 20 false 1 1280Kb false 150
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Figure 3: Two spider charts showing nondominated protocol instances. Figure 3(a) consid-
ers the protocol instances Tree-based-{128}, Poulidor-{128}, and TMA-{128}. Figure 3(b)
considers the protocol instances Swiss-Knife-{128} and SKI-{64, 2}. All axes have been
normalized with respect to an ideal protocol instance executing 128 rounds that takes the
optimal value for each attribute.
• KA does not perform well in terms of distance fraud (see Figure 5).
However, its resistance to mafia fraud can be as good as the one pro-
vided by the Tree-based protocol without demanding an exponential
amount of memory (see Figure 4). Therefore, KA is also nondomi-
nated.
It is worth remarking that, according to Table 4, the set of nondominated
protocols is rather stable with y. The only exception is Poulidor, that be-
comes a member of the set of nondominated protocols for y ≤ 2−16. This
behavior is likely to be due to the fact that the actual distance fraud re-
sistance of the Poulidor protocol cannot be computed yet [33, 32], but an
upper-bound only.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we have proposed a methodology to evaluate and compare
distance bounding protocols. The methodology benefits from experiences in
the decision making field, and defines the most relevant attributes that ought
to be considered in terms of security and implementability. An open-source
computer software implementing our methodology has been released, which
supported the evaluation and comparison of thirteen state-of-the-art distance
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bounding protocols. Among the evaluated protocols, only seven are relevant
(nondominated) in terms of the considered criteria, namely resistance to
mafia, distance, and terrorist fraud, number of cryptographic operations,
memory, presence of a final slow phase, and use of a multiple-bit channel.
Clearly, most disqualified protocols had an important role in the evolution
of distance bounding protocols, but they are obsolete today. Future designs
of distance bounding protocols must, therefore, prove to be nondominanted
with respect to a set of relevant criteria. Our results also show that the
asymptotic analysis of distance bounding protocols, as done commonly in
the literature, is inadequate and misleading. Finally, a clear side effect of
our methodology is that it can be used for ad-hoc decision making where the
decision maker is free to prioritize some attributes over others.
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Appendix
Figures 4, 5, and 6, depict the resistance of each protocol to mafia, dis-
tance, and terrorist fraud respectively. The attribute value for each fraud
come from the protocol instance that minimizes it. For example, given
e = 32, the resistance to mafia fraud of the KA protocol is taken from the
protocol instance KA-{32, 1}. On the contrary, its distance fraud resistance
considering again e = 32 is taken from the protocol instance KA-{32, 0}.
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Figure 4: Mafia fraud resistance of the considered protocols for e ∈ {32, 64, · · · , 258}.
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Figure 5: Distance fraud resistance of the considered protocols for e ∈ {32, 64, · · · , 258}.
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Figure 6: Terrorist fraud resistance of the considered protocols for e ∈ {32, 64, · · · , 258}.
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